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Abstract 
This study uses an incentive-compatible experimental online supermarket to assess whether 
prior environmentally-friendly behaviour outside the store, and whether carbon taxes motivate 
sustainable consumption. Previous research suggests that past decisions may influence current 
decisions, for example because consumers compensate morally desirable and undesirable acts 
(e.g. high-carbon food baskets may follow past environmentally-friendly behaviours) over 
time; while carbon taxes have been promoted as effective tools to reduce the carbon footprint 
of food baskets, despite limited empirical evidence. After controlling for past consumption, 
results show that being required to recall past environmentally-friendly behaviour before 
shopping led consumers to purchase more sustainable food baskets. Carbon taxation also 
strongly reduces the carbon footprint of food baskets, showing no interaction with the recall of 
past behaviours.  
Keywords: sustainable consumption; moral licensing; priming; carbon footprint; carbon tax. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article uses a novel incentive-compatible experimental design involving an online 
supermarket to study interventions to potentially reduce the carbon footprint of actual food 
choices. The interest on this research stems from current concerns over the sustainability of 
current food consumption (e.g. Garnett 2011; Grunert, Hieke, and Wills 2014; McMichael et 
al. 2007). Carbon emissions from food choices are estimated to account for around 30% of total 
household greenhouse gas emission in developed economies, with supermarkets capturing a 
large share of food expenditures (e.g., Panzone, Wossink, and Southerton 2013). As a result, 
there is increasing recognition that an effective sustainability policy requires the direct 
involvement of consumers (Dietz et al. 2009; Vandenbergh and Steinemann 2007), and that 
changes in consumer choices in-store can lead to significant reductions in the carbon footprint 
of food baskets (Panzone et al. 2016). The specific objective of this research was to test whether 
the recall of past environmentally-friendly behaviour, and the use of a carbon tax are effective 
in reducing the carbon footprint of supermarket food shopping. To ensure incentive 
compatibility, consumers made real choices and actually received the goods they purchased.  
An individual’s involvement in activities that contribute to environmental protection may 
be related to her moral identity (Jia et al. 2017), which refers to an individual’s propensity to 
give up personal consumption benefits to the advantage of society. Morality is also assigned to 
contributions to the public good in the form of low-carbon consumption (Daube and Ulph 
2016), with “green” consumers being considered ethical and altruistic individuals (Mazar and 
Zhong 2010). However, food consumption is cyclical, and consumers repeatedly make choices 
carrying environmental implications (e.g., in a weekly shopping trip to a store): consumers 
make multiple moral choices within the same consumption episode (e.g. choosing whether to 
purchase high-carbon meat or low-carbon meat substitutes, followed by the choice of organic 
or standard vegetables), as well as across episodes (e.g. purchasing high-carbon meat again this 
week, after having purchased it last week). Food choices may also be influenced by behaviour 
in other domains (e.g. purchasing low-carbon food in a supermarket after having saved water 
in the past week). As a result, consumers are called to manifest their morality over time and 
over domains, and a dynamic model of moral behaviour might be more effective in describing 
consumer decisions.  
Previous experimental research has typically studied why consumers engage in specific 
environmentally-friendly behaviours. The study of a single instance of behaviour implicitly 
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assumes that one decision is sufficient to characterise the environmental preferences of an 
consumer, who acts consistently in order to reduce the psychological discomfort produced by 
inconsistent behaviours (Festinger 1962). This personological model of moral behaviour views 
morality as a stable construct, where moral individuals only engage in moral acts; however, it 
fails to explain why over time individuals may alternate moral and immoral behaviours (Effron 
and Conway 2015; Khan and Dhar 2006; Mazar and Zhong 2010; Miller and Effron 2010). For 
instance, consumers may manifest moral licensing, where “desirable” (e.g. pro-social) acts 
motivate subsequent “undesirable” acts (Khan and Dhar 2006; Mazar and Zhong 2010); for 
example, a consumer may feel justified in buying a high-carbon meat product after purchasing 
organic fruit. Cognitive dissonance can only explain compensatory behaviours in cases where 
individuals go into “moral debit” following an antisocial act, and then react by doing something 
desirable: for instance, an initial behaviour causing dissonance (e.g. overconsuming water 
despite caring for its conservation in Dickerson et al. 1992) may lead people to restore the 
positive link between environmental attitudes and behaviour (e.g. by shortening their shower) 
when this inconsistency is made salient.  
To allow for a more general representation of moral behaviour, Monin and Jordan (2009) 
present a dynamic model of self-regulation where morality is driven by the moral self-image 
of the agent: individuals use past moral behaviour to remove the concern of appearing uncaring 
in subsequent moral tasks (moral licensing, e.g. Mazar and Zhong 2010; Mullen and Monin 
2016); while past immoral behaviour motivates individuals to make reparations in present 
choices (moral cleansing, e.g. Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin 2009). This approach views 
individuals as targeting a certain “morality threshold” that they aim to achieve and maintain. 
In this view, when facing a moral dilemma, individuals will engage in moral behaviour 
whenever the perceived moral self-worth accumulated through past choices is below a desired 
level; and will behave immorally when the perceived moral self-worth is above the desired 
level. As a result, in this article we analyse consumer supermarket behaviour over a two-week 
period, exploring the link between in-store and out-of-store environmental behaviour, as well 
as morality using a dynamic model of behaviour.  
A key objective of this study is to experimentally investigate strategies that will 
encourage environmentally responsible behaviour in a simulated on-line supermarket, similar 
to Demarque et al. (2015), who studied the impact of presenting normative reference points on 
the purchase of eco-labelled products. Focusing on carbon footprint as our key behavioural 
variable, our first manipulation tests whether reminding consumers of recent environmental 
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behaviour motivates or demotivates subsequent environmental behaviour (measured in terms 
of the carbon footprint of a food basket). More specifically, the experiment tests whether 
morality in two different domains (food shopping versus other areas of behaviour) are 
complements (they co-occur) or substitutes (one comes at the expense of the other) (e.g. 
Nauges and Wheeler 2017). Previous research suggests that consumers making consecutive 
decisions within the same consumption episode and targeting different goals, e.g. hedonic 
pleasure and eating healthily, choose by alternating goals (e.g. Dhar and Simonson 1999; 
Fishbach and Dhar 2005). However, limited research has focused on environmental goals, and 
very few have studied behaviour across consumption domains, observing instances of moral 
licensing (Tiefenbeck et al. 2013) as well as consistency (Greenberg 2014).  
Our second manipulation explores the role of carbon taxation to drive consistent 
sustainable low-carbon behaviour in supermarkets. Carbon taxes are often considered a key 
instrument to reduce global warming as they increase the cost of consumption-driven 
greenhouse gas emissions (Boardman 2008; Metcalf and Weisbach 2009; Pearce 1991). 
General work on carbon taxation indicates that it has the potential to reduce household carbon 
emissions by up to 80% (Metcalf and Weisbach 2009), with particularly strong effects on the 
consumption of energy (Brännlund and Nordström 2004). In the particular context of food 
consumption, policy has focused on nutrient-based taxes, targeting directly e.g. alcohol 
(Panzone 2012), sugar (Zizzo et al. 2016), or fat content (Papoutsi et al. 2015). In contrast, 
limited research has focused on the impact of carbon taxes on food consumption (e.g. Briggs 
et al. 2016). As such, a carbon tax would mirror this strategy by taxing a constituent of food 
products with environmental instead of health implications. Because green taxes are designed 
primarily to reduce externalities rather than raise revenues, in the experiment we use a carbon 
tax designed to ensure revenue-neutrality by returning the tax revenues to consumers as 
income. Note that the carbon tax was announced to consumers, thus potentially sending a signal 
about the environmental quality of the options under consideration (Hilton et al. 2014).  
We also test for the interaction of taxation and environmental recall. In fact, previous 
research has highlighted that price interventions can influence intrinsic pro-environmental 
motivation: focusing on grocery, Perino, Panzone, and Swanson (2014) show that subsidising 
sustainable products can reduce their consumption; similarly, taxes can demotivate ecological 
behaviour, particularly when considered unfair (see Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Rode, 
Gómez-Baggethun, and Krause 2015). As such, the literature indicates that a tax can crowd in 
motivation by signalling the importance of sustainability in the mind of the policymaker, as 
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well as crowd out motivation by removing the ability to self-signal interest in pro-social 
behaviour (Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel 2011).   
The rest of the article is as follows. The next section discusses the model of dynamic 
moral self-regulation, and consumer behaviour used in the analysis. This section also explains 
how the experimental treatments can be used to increase consistency in the purchase of low-
carbon baskets. Section 3 describes the data collection method. Section 3 presents the results 
of the econometric analysis. Finally, section 4 discusses the implications of the results for 
policy and academia, while section 5 briefly concludes this article.  
2. DYNAMIC MORAL SELF-REGULATION, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, 
AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 
This section sets out a simple model of consumer behaviour when individuals care about both 
the direct hedonic pleasure and the environmental impact of the goods they buy. The section 
starts with a standard one-period model of moral consumer behaviour, which is then extended 
to a multi-period model of moral behaviour. The section will then continue by contextualising 
the theoretical implications of the experimental treatments, also identifying testable hypotheses 
in an econometric model of demand for carbon emission.  
2.1. A one-period model of moral consumer behaviour  
Consider a consumer i with characteristics Di. During a weekly shop for food, the consumer is 
faced with a choice of j = 1,…, J products, which differ in their carbon footprint cj, and 
kilocalories zj,, and other observable characteristics, e.g. brands (which are omitted for 
simplicity). Goods are sold with market prices p = (p1, …, pJ). The consumer faces a budget 
constraint, which is represented by the consumer’s overall expenditure limit, E, so that  
σ ݔ௜௝݌௝௝ ൅ ݓ௜ ൌ ௜ܻ ൅ ݓ௜ ൌ ܧ௜        (1) 
where Yi are in-store expenditures, wi is the outside good, which for simplicity has a unit price, 
and xij  is the quantity of good j purchased. Apart from the direct utility the consumer derives 
from consuming xij, the consumer gains utility from: a) the morality of consumption, in 
particular the environmental impact of a good (e.g. Cornelissen et al. 2008; Mazar and Zhong 
2010), which is negatively related to the carbon footprint cj; and b) the healthiness of 
consumption, whose impact is also negatively related to the indicator variable zj. The variables 
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cj and zj are measures of damage to the environment and health respectively caused by a unit 
of consumption of good j 
Similar to a moral bank account, the consumer can earn moral credits by engaging in 
activities that protect the public good, and consume them in activities that damage it. The flow 
of environmental and health benefits the consumer derives from consumption are defined as 
݉௜ ൌ ݉଴௜ െ σ ݔ௜௝ ௝ܿ௝         (2) 
݄௜ ൌ ݄଴௜ െ σ ݔ௜௝ݖ௝௝         (3) 
Equation (2) indicates that in a static model of moral behaviour, an individual i’s self-worth 
(measured in units of carbon footprint) corresponds to the moral credits earned in all other areas 
of behaviour, ݉଴௜, minus the credits lost by the carbon footprint ij j
j
x c¦  of the individual’s 
consumption choices. Equation (3) replicates this process for health considerations for 
completeness. However, health credits have private implications and do not impact the moral 
self-image of the consumer, and are not our focus.  
In a complex basket formation task, the resulting objective of the consumer is to 
determine the quantity of each product j to purchase, ݔ௜௝, by maximising the utility function 
(Hanemann 1984; Manchanda, Ansari, and Gupta 1999; Nair, Dubé, and Chintagunta 2005)  
௜ܷ൫ݔ௜ଵǡ ݔ௜ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௜௃ǡ݉௜ǡ ݄௜ǡ ݓ௜൯  
subject to the usual budget constraint (1), as well as the moral and health constraints (2) and 
(3). The total carbon footprint demanded by consumer i can now be written as  
¦ 
j
ijji xcC          (4) 
2.2. A multi-period model of moral consumer behaviour  
The model presented in the previous section refers to a moral self-regulation process in which 
the individual cares about the flow of moral self-worth. The model becomes dynamic if the 
individual cares also about the overall stock of moral self-worth that he builds over time to 
shape his moral self (Bénabou and Tirole 2011; Mullen and Monin 2016; Zhong, Liljenquist, 
and Cain 2009). Following Ulph, Panzone and Hilton (2017), suppose, as in equation (2), that 
consumption decisions in a given period t, xijt, generate the current flow of moral self-worth as  
8 
 
݉௜௧ ൌ ݉଴௜௧ െ ܥ௜௧         (5) 
Also, suppose that an individual’s stock of moral-worth at the start of period t is denoted by 
ܯ௜௧, and that stock at the start of period t+1, ܯ௜௧ାଵ depends (positively) on the stock of moral 
credits at the start of period t, the moral credits earned in period t from other activities, ݉଴௜ǡ௧, 
and (negatively) from current consumption of carbon emissions, ܥ௜ǡ௧, as  
ܯ௜௧ାଵ ൌ ߮ܯ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݉଴௜ǡ௧ െ ܥ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߮ܯ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݉௜௧      (6) 
where 0 < ߮ < 1 captures the fact that the past stock of moral self-worth loses salience over 
time (see e.g. Conway and Peetz 2012), for instance by forgetting relevant past behaviour.  
Current decisions take account of both the flow of moral self-worth, as represented by 
the utility function U(.), and the future well-being, as represented by the value function V, as  
௜ܸሺܯ௜௧ሻ ൌ ௫೔೟ ሾ ௜ܷሺݔ௜௧ǡ݉௜௧ǡ ݄௜௧ǡ ݓ௜௧ሻ ൅ ߜ ௜ܸሺ߮ܯ௜௧ ൅ ݉௜௧ሻሿ    (7) 
where 0 < δ < 1 is the intertemporal discount factor. Assuming separability of the utility 
function to eliminate cross-price effects, the utility function can be written as 
௜ܷሺݔ௜௧ǡ݉௜௧ǡ ݄௜௧ǡ ݓ௜௧ሻ ൌ σ ௜ܷ௝൫ݔ௜௝௧൯௝ ൅ ߱௠ ௜ܷ௠ሺ݉௜௧ሻ ൅ ߱௛ ௜ܷ௛ሺ݄௜௧ሻ ൅ݓ௜௧        (8) 
where ߱௠ (߱௛) is the weight the individual gives to well-being from moral self-worth (health) 
relative to the direct utility from the consumption of the goods2. This approach inherently 
assumes full separability of any consumption outside the experimental design to the extent that 
consumers are expected to obtain the same utility from items consumed in the experimental 
store as well as outside of it. The interventions below have been designed to influence consumer 
behaviour by affecting the parameters of equation (7) and (8), as described next.  
 
2.3. Making current moral self-worth dynamic: Environmental recall as an 
environmental nudge  
A first treatment gives an unexpected exogenous shock of size θi to the individual’s flow of 
moral self-worth mi, which occurs prior to the individual choosing consumption. The flow of 
moral self-worth changes as a consequence as 
                                                          
2 It is perhaps worth noting that if we defined: ෩ܷ௜௧ሺ݉௜௧ሻ ൅ ߜ ௜ܸሺߩܯ௜௧ ൅ ݉௜௧ሻ, then there would effectively be no 
difference between the static one-period model in section 2.1 and the dynamic model in this section.  
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݉௜௧ ൌ ݉଴௜௧ െ ܥ௜௧ ൅ ߠ௜௧  
with a resulting stock  
ܯ௜௧ାଵ ൌ ߮ܯ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݉଴௜ǡ௧ െ ܥ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߠ௜௧  
The values of ݉଴௜௧ and θit are known at the time of the decision on Cit at any time t for 
individuals in this treatment. This shock can, in theory, be positive or negative. However, this 
section focuses on a positive and exogenous shock, which is the case of our experiment. Then 
the parameter θi gives a temporary boost to moral self-worth, which can be seen as a windfall 
in moral credits that the individual suddenly finds in his moral credits account. 
There are two possible effects of this shock. The first, direct, effect is that this increase 
in the flow of moral self-worth licences the consumer to reduce the amount of effort allocated 
to current moral consumption3 (moral licensing, see Khan and Dhar 2006). This direct effect 
is then expected to increase the carbon footprint of a basket in response to an exogenous 
increase in the flow of moral self-worth (a negative initial shock would instead result in moral 
cleansing, see Sachdeva et al. 2009, with a subsequent reduction in the carbon footprint of the 
basket). As Ulph, Panzone and Hilton (2017) show, this offsetting licensing effect will be less 
than the shock itself, leading to an overall increase in the flow of moral self-worth, which in 
the dynamic model will also increase the future stock of moral self-worth, Mit+1. A second, 
indirect effect is that the shock could self-signal the individual’s commitment to the moral goal 
(Baca-Motes et al. 2013; Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Gneezy et al. 2012), priming greater 
compliance with the moral goal, as observed in other contexts where pro-social priming or 
framing has been applied (e.g. Cookson 2000; Elliott, Hayward, and Canon 1998; Liberman, 
Samuels, and Ross 2004). In the model, this effect operates by increasing the weight the 
consumer assigns to the moral component of the utility function, ߱௠ as a consequence of the 
shock, i.e. 0m
it
Z
T
w !w . This commitment effect moves in the opposite direction to the licensing 
effect, reducing in the carbon footprint of the basket. This leads to a first set of hypotheses: 
H1a:  An exogenous shock to moral self-worth increases the carbon footprint of an 
individual’s shopping basket (moral licensing effect) if it raises the moral self-
image of an individual, so that ߲ܥ௜ ߲ߠ௜ൗ ൐ Ͳ. 
                                                          
3 This would be the only strategy in the case of a static model of morality.  
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H1b:  An exogenous shock to moral self-worth reduces the carbon footprint of an 
individual’s shopping basket (moral consistency effect) if it influences the 
perceived importance assigned to morality, so that ߲ܥ௜ ߲ߠ௜ൗ ൏ 0 
 
2.4. Raising the costs of carbon: Carbon taxation as a tool for reducing the 
consumption of carbon emissions 
Carbon taxes are often advocated as an option to reduce the carbon footprint of baskets by 
incorporating the external costs of carbon footprint into the price of the good. The role of price 
instruments in changing behaviour is based on the general premise that price changes force 
consumers to reallocate their budget from the now more expensive (e.g. taxed) options to 
cheaper ones. The tax treatment increases the marginal price of the carbon footprint by a value 
T equal to the rate of the tax per unit of carbon footprint, to that the price of all goods ݌௝ is 
increased by ௝߬ ൌ ܶ ௝ܿ. Notably, taxation inevitably induces both price effects, whereby 
consumers shift to low CO2 equivalent (CO2e) products,4 which are now relatively cheaper 
(due to a lower tax), as well as income effects, as consumers buy less because the tax reduces 
their disposable income. A redistribution mechanism embedded into the treatment removes 
these income effects by returning total revenues from the tax, σ ߬௜௝௝ , in equal shares to all 
consumers.5 Consequently, the manipulation refers only to price effects. In addition, our 
combined tax and redistribution manipulation mirrors the fact that green taxes are normally 
designed to induce changes in behaviour that benefit the environment, but not to raise 
additional revenue for the government, and so are designed to be revenue-neutral, by using 
offsetting reductions in other taxes. 
Apart from a standard direct effect, where the tax reduces consumption by raising market 
prices, the tax can also have an indirect behavioural effect: the mere presence of a tax can have 
psychological effects that can reinforce or diminish the pure economic effect of this policy 
instrument (see e.g. Sunstein and Reisch 2014). For instance, knowledge of the tax might 
                                                          
4 In the remainder of the article, the carbon footprint will be reported in terms of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). 
Specifically, the carbon footprint consists of carbon dioxide (CO2) as well as other gases that affect the atmosphere 
(CFCs and methane, for instance); the carbon footprint converts the damage caused by these gases into the amount 
of CO2 needed to cause the same damage, and adds all the gases into a single metric, known as CO2e. gCO2e 
stands for grams of carbon dioxide equivalent. 
5 Note that, because the taxation is by construction higher than the fraction that is returned via the redistribution 
mechanism, this remains a genuine price manipulation as opposed to a purely psychological one. 
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trigger psychological tax aversion (Sussman and Olivola 2011) and lead to an additional purely 
behavioural response that reinforces the direct price effect and reduces the consumption of 
undesirable (and taxed) goods (e.g. Zizzo et al. 2016). At the same time, taxes signal “good” 
and “bad” products to consumers, and by doing so they can activate social preferences that lead 
to a stronger effect than that of the price change alone (Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012). 
Imposition of a tax can also lead to paradoxical effects, increasing rather than decreasing 
intentions to consume carbon (Hilton et al. 2014). However, our experimental design does not 
allow isolating pure price effects from pure behavioural effects of carbon taxation, which is not 
in the remit of this article; in practical policy applications, the two sets of effects are likely to 
occur in combination. The second working hypothesis is that  
H2: A revenue-neutral carbon tax will reduce the average carbon footprint of baskets by 
increasing the marginal price of carbon footprint in the basket. 
2.5. The interaction between price interventions and a moral self-esteem shock 
A consumer’s response to taxation may depend on the amount of environmental self-worth the 
individual holds. In general, for a consumer who assigns a higher value to environmental 
preservation (and hence has a higher implicit price for a good) a given environmental tax will 
represent a smaller proportionate increase in the implicit price than an individual with a lower 
value for environmental preservation, and so the tax would be expected to have a greater impact 
on the latter baskets. Nevertheless, in general an increase in moral self-worth would be expected 
to reduce the sensitivity to a carbon tax: a sudden (and free) increase in the amount of moral 
credits owned from a positive self-worth shock ߠ௜ should reduce the demand for further moral 
behaviour (e.g. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008), therefore reducing the need to respond to a tax 
requesting a reduction in the carbon footprint of a basket. Alternatively, there could be a 
negative interaction between tax and recall: the imposition of a carbon tax may remove the 
impact of  environmental recall on pro-environmental identity because consumers no longer 
attribute the cause of a low-carbon basket to preferences for sustainability, but to a desire to 
minimise the tax paid (e.g. Perino et al. 2014; Zuckerman, Iazzaro, and Waldgeir 1979) – as in 
the forced-constraint treatments of dissonance experiments (see discussion in Hilton et al. 
2014). According to this second effect, the tax might remove the psychological link between 
the environmental impact of food choices and other behaviours, moving the impact of 
environmental recall towards zero. These effects lead to a third set of testable hypotheses:  
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H3a: The increase in moral self-worth reduces the sensitivity to a carbon tax, increasing 
(ceteris paribus) the carbon footprint of the basket relative to a tax alone. 
H3b: If taxation removes the moral self-attribution of pro-environmental behaviour, the 
presence of a carbon tax can remove the impact of environmental recall on the 
carbon footprint.  
 
2.6. Specification of the model to be estimated 
The utility-maximisation process identifies the optimal consumption of carbon footprint in the 
basket, Cit, as from equation (4). This carbon footprint depends on a vector of individual 
characteristics Dit (which includes the current credits from other past environmentally-friendly 
behaviours, 0itm ), and on the experimental treatments ܫ௜ ؠ ሾߠ௜௧ǡ ௜ܶ௧ǡ ௜ܶ௧ߠ௜௧ሿ, where θ and T refer, 
respectively, to the moral self-worth shock and the carbon tax. The demand for carbon footprint 
is specified using the log-linear regression  
݈݊ሺܥ௜௧ሻ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߚ௧ܦ௜௧ ൅ ߛ௧ܫ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧        (9) 
where ߛ ؠ ሾߛఏǡ ߛ்ǡ ߛ்ఏሿ. The list of hypotheses above entails the following: a moral licensing 
effect (H1a) implies ߛఏ ൐ Ͳ; a moral consistency effect (H1b) would imply ߛఏ < 0; a successful 
carbon tax (H2) would require ߛ் ൏ Ͳ; if the moral self-esteem shock reduces the effectiveness 
of a tax (H3a), then ߛ்ఏ ൐ Ͳ; If taxation removes moral self-attribution (H3b), then ߛ்ఏ ൏ Ͳ.  
Because interventions are week-specific, carbon emissions in week 2 can be written as 
݈݊ሺܥ௜ଶሻ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ߚଶܦ௜ଶ ൅ ߛଶܫ௜ଶ ൅ ߝ௜ଶ      (10) 
Residuals ߝ௜ଶ may contain unobservable preferences for low-carbon baskets that can add 
variance to the estimate and cause problems of endogeneity in the regression. Following Bajari 
et al. (2012), these unobservable preferences can be differenced out by assuming residuals 
follow a first-order Markov process, so that  
ߝ௜ଶ ൌ ߩߝ௜ଵ ൅ ߭௜ଶ         (11) 
To this extent, carbon emissions at week 1 correspond to   
݈݊ሺܥ௜ଵሻ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߚଵܦ௜ଵ ൅ ߝ௜ଵ       (12) 
After isolating ߝ௜ଵ in equation (12) and replacing it in equation (11), equations (10) becomes  
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݈݊ሺܥ௜ଶሻ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ߚଶܦ௜ଶ ൅ ߛଶܫ௜ଶ ൅ ߩሾ݈݊ሺܥ௜ଵሻ െ ߙଵ െ ߚଵܦ௜ଵሿ ൅ ߭௜ଶ  (13) 
which, assuming a constant intercept, can be re-written as the estimable equation  
݈݊ሺܥ௜ଶሻ ൌ ߙሺͳ െ ߩሻ ൅ ߚଶܦ௜ଶ െ ߩߚଵܦ௜ଵ ൅ ߛଶܫ௜ଶ ൅ ߩ ݈݊ሺܥ௜ଵሻ ൅ ߭௜ଶ  (14) 
In equation (14), the coefficients γ2, β2 and ρ are estimated directly; the coefficients α and β1 
are instead obtained from the regression parameters by dividing them, respectively, by (1 – ρ) 
and ρ. For time-invariant variables within D (e.g. demographics), β1 can be identified only by 
assuming constant coefficients (β1 = β2 = β), and diving the resulting estimate by (1 – ρ).  
 
3. DATA AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A total of 260 students were recruited to participate in an online shopping experiment. They 
were paid a £5 fee purely for their time, and were assigned a £25 weekly budget to shop in the 
store for two consecutive weeks. The online shop presented consumers with 665 food and (non-
alcoholic) drink products currently available in Tesco stores (Figure 1). A key criterion for 
inclusion of products in the store was the availability of an actual full (i.e. pre-discount) price 
in Tesco stores, carbon footprint (in CO2e), and nutritional facts (kcal, and grams of selected 
macronutrients) for each item. The store uses existing products from Tesco6, which have actual 
carbon footprint measures from a single source and for a wide range of products, covering all 
the categories of interest of the participants of the study7. Participants were informed at the 
start that they could spend as much as they wished in store, and any unspent budget was then 
added to their participation fee and given to them at the end of the experiment. To ensure 
incentive compatibility, participants were given the goods they had purchased in one of the two 
weeks of shopping (chosen randomly at the end of the experiment). Collection worked as a 
“click-and-collect” scheme: participants would come and collect their baskets and their 
compensation the week after the end of the experiment. Of the 260 participants recruited, 235 
participated in the first week of shopping, and 230 participants returned in the second week.  
 
3.1. Experimental design 
                                                          
6 The dataset initially consisted of the products in the list available at 
https://www.tescoplc.com/assets/files/cms/Tesco_Product_Carbon_Footprints_Summary(1).pdf. Tesco kindly 
provided further information on products that were footprinted after this document was published online.  
7 A pre-survey and a survey pilot identified which products the target population purchased more frequently.  
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The experimental design consisted of a 2 (environmental recall vs no environmental recall) x 
2 (carbon tax vs no tax) orthogonal between-participants experimental design for 199 
participants. The experimental design is shown in Figure 2. In each experimental week, 
participants completed the following steps (in the exact order): they reported their perceived 
environmental self-image (from Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan 2011); they shopped; and 
completed a questionnaire on their attitudes and beliefs on the importance of the environment, 
and their socio-economic characteristics (only in week 1). A fifth “no-self-image” group (31 
individuals) was included as a second control to test whether the environmental self-image 
question had a priming effect on participants; in this treatment, there was the after self-image 
question before shopping in both weeks. Week 2 was the same as week 1 for each treatment 
with the following two exceptions:  
a. An environmental recall manipulation was implemented in the two treatments with 
environmental recall: consumers started by completing a questionnaire that asked them 
to report how frequently they had performed a number of pro-environmental behaviours 
in the previous week, which were then converted into carbon savings that were notified 
to participants (see section 3.1.1 for details). Consumers answered the environmental 
self-image question after filling this questionnaire, and then shopped. 
b. A carbon tax manipulation was implemented in the tax treatments: a carbon tax was 
introduced and changed food prices proportionally to the carbon content of a food 
product (all tax revenue was redistributed; see section 3.1.2 for details).  
 
3.1.1 Environmental recall manipulation  
The environmental recall treatment aimed to raise the perceived moral self-worth of 
participants. Here, consumers were asked to indicate the frequency over the last seven days of 
a number of environmental behaviours shown in Table 1 below, using a questionnaire that 
requested:   
“Please pause one moment and think about the activities you have done in the past 
week (i.e. in the past 7 days) to help protect the environment for you and for others. 
How often have you done any of these during the last week? 
Carbon savings available in the second week of shopping were estimated for each of these 
behaviours on the basis of published data to determine the total amount of CO2e saved by each 
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participant over the past week. Straight after completing this questionnaire (therefore before 
entering the shop and reporting their environmental self-image), participants were notified that  
“CONGRATULATIONS! Over the last seven days you have saved [estimated CO2e 
saved] grams of CO2e”.  
This approach allowed consumers to recall socially desirable acts they performed in the recent 
past, while quantifying the social benefits of such acts using a carbon footprint metric. 
Participants who were not in an environmental recall treatment filled the environmental recall 
questionnaire at the end of the week 2 survey, and were not notified of their carbon savings.  
3.1.1. Carbon tax manipulation 
In the first week of the experiment, the prices of the goods reflected the exact prices consumers 
would find in Tesco stores (removing all discounts). These prices did not change in the second 
week for those participants in the control and the environmental recall treatment. In the second 
week, participants in both treatments with a carbon tax were presented with prices that reflected 
the carbon content of the products available in store. This carbon tax, measured as the CO2e 
content of each product multiplied by a £70/tonne of CO2e (in line with estimates from DECC 
2016), was added  to the baseline price, which on average raised food prices by 8.47%. To 
ensure the visibility of the carbon tax, consumers were presented with full prices (i.e. inclusive 
of the tax), with the addition of a line below the price indicating “This price includes £[value] 
of carbon tax” (see Figure 1 above). For the reasons discussed in section 2.4, total tax revenues 
were redistributed to participants in the two treatments with a carbon tax, who were reimbursed 
by the average tax paid. Participants were clearly notified of this redistribution before the 
shopping task. 
 
3.2. Measuring carbon footprint of baskets  
As discussed in section 1, sustainable consumption of the consumer in each weekly shopping 
episode is measured in terms of the carbon footprint of the basket in grams of CO2e, to 
circumvent problems of aggregation of products that can differ noticeably in product quality. 
Econometrically, this represents the consumer demand for carbon footprint. Similarly, as 
already noted above, the frequency of the behaviour from the environmental recall 
questionnaire reported in Table 1 was converted into grams of CO2 equivalents saved in the 
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previous week by engaging in the environmental activities. This meant that a person’s moral 
self-worth was measured in the same metric as the environmental impact of the basket.  
4. RESULTS 
This section presents the experimental evidence of the impact of environmental recall and 
carbon tax on consumer behaviour. Results indicate that a carbon tax is very effective in 
reducing the carbon footprint of food baskets, with estimates that are robust to variable choice 
and model specification; the requirement to recall of past environmental behaviours is also 
associated with a reduction in carbon footprint, with estimates that are again robust across 
regressions, although significance can change depending on the regression specification. The 
two effects are similar in magnitudes, so that a moral recall task provide reductions comparable 
to those of a £70/tonnes CO2e tax. The two treatment manipulations do not interact 
significantly. In presenting these results, we begin by introducing the characteristics of the 
sample, with a particular focus on carbon consumed and saved, and consumers’ environmental 
self-image. These initial steps are then followed by a regression analysis to test our 
experimental hypotheses (as spelled out in section 1.5 above).  
The analysis below also uses a number of constructs from the literature on moral and 
prosocial behaviour. The first item is an “environmental identity” scale adapted from the moral 
identity scale of Aquino and Reed (2002) by focusing only on “environmentally-friendly” as 
the moral attribute being assessed (see online appendix 2).8 A second item is the short Social 
Desirability Scale (Stöber 2001), which measures the extent to which an individual behaves 
pro-socially (see online appendix 2). A third item is the intertemporal discount rate (IDR), 
which measures the importance given to future consumption: IDR was calculated asking 
consumers to indicate their WTP for compensation to wait to use a £50 money voucher for one 
year (Zauberman et al. 2009), with the IDR calculated as ݎ ൌ ୪୬ቂ
ሺହ଴ାௐ்௉ሻ ହ଴ൗ ቃ
ଵ . Knowledge of 
product carbon footprint was measured as the sum of correct answers to eight questions asking 
participants to identify high carbon options within a pair of goods. Finally, following 
Cornelissen et al. (2008), we measured pro-environmental attitudes (how consumers feel about 
environmental behaviours), moral obligation (the extent to which consumers feel morally 
                                                          
8 A principal component analysis yielded the same two factors of the original scale (online appendix 2): 
internalisation, which measures how central environmental identity is to the self-concept of the consumer; and 
symbolisation, which measures how much the respondent believes his actions reflect this identity. 
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obliged to protect the environment), and self-perception (how environmentally-friendly 
consumers perceive their actions to be) (see online appendix 1).  
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
The experiment collected information on 199 participants allocated to the main experiment, 
plus 31 consumers in the no-self-image control. Table 2 shows the demographic breakdown of 
all treatments: apart from the share of British nationals, participants did not differ significantly 
across groups. In comparing baskets across weeks, Table 3 also shows that consumers spent 
the same amount of money in both weeks; however, the carbon footprint in the basket dropped 
in all treatments, suggesting that consumers substituted lower-carbon goods, with the largest 
drop in total carbon footprint when both the tax and the environmental recall treatment 
manipulations were presented jointly. Albeit non-significant, the drop is unexpected for the 
control treatment, and could be driven by the participants learning about the environmental 
focus of the experiment or the environmental quality of the goods, changes in their own 
inventories, as well as by external factors unobservable to the econometrician (e.g. news on the 
media). The environmental self-image of the consumers also did not vary significantly as a 
result of the main treatment manipulations.  
4.1.1. Consumption of carbon footprint across weeks 
Table 3 shows that all experimental treatments witness a reduction in carbon footprint in week 
2 baskets. This point is represented graphically in Figure 3 below, which compares the control 
treatment with self-image to the treatments with experimental manipulations; and in Figure 4 
below, which compares the two control treatments. These graphs show that while the control 
reduced consumption by an average of 1,510 gCO2e; median drop: 31 gCO2e), the footprint 
dropped by 1,404 gCO2e (median drop: 902 gCO2e) in the control with the after self-image 
question, by 2,376 gCO2e (median drop: 1,309 gCO2e) in the environmental recall treatment, 
by 2,854 gCO2e (median drop: 2,741 gCO2e) in the tax treatment, and by 4,227 gCO2e (median 
drop: 2,659gCO2e) for the joint manipulations treatment. The net average reduction relative to 
the control equals 867 gCO2e for environmental recall, 1,344 gCO2e for a carbon tax, and 2,718 
gCO2e for a joint manipulations treatment; the control with the after self-image question shows 
a net increase of 105 gCO2e relative to the control. A median test reveals that the median drop 
in carbon footprint of baskets in the control group with self-image question is not different 
from the control with the after self-image question (p = 0.548), but is significantly smaller than 
that of the environmental recall treatment (p = 0.088), tax treatment (p = 0.015), and joint recall 
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and tax treatment (p = 0.003). Importantly, Figure 4 indicates that the presence of the 
environmental self-image question before the shopping trip did not prime participants into 
purchasing lower-carbon baskets: consumers who were asked the environmental self-image 
question before shopping in fact had a non-significantly higher (rather than lower) carbon 
footprint in their basket in both weeks. 
Despite differences in the amount of carbon emissions in baskets across the two weeks, 
the natural logarithm of the carbon footprint of the baskets in the first and second weeks was 
strongly correlated in all treatments, with Spearman rank correlation ρ = 0.83 (p < 0.001) in 
the control treatment with self-image question, 0.80 in the control treatment without self-image 
question,  ρ = 0.87 (p < 0.001) in the tax treatment, ρ = 0.80 (p < 0.001) in the environmental 
recall treatments, and  ρ = 0.58 (p < 0.001) in the environmental recall + tax treatment. Finally, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that the distribution of the natural logarithm of the carbon 
footprint in the baskets did not change across weeks in each of the treatments. 
4.1.2. Estimated carbon savings 
All participants in the sample were asked to fill the environmental recall questionnaire of Table 
1, aimed at estimating the carbon footprint consumers saved in the past week by engaging in a 
series of environmentally-friendly behaviours. As explained in section 3.1.1, half of the sample 
filled a questionnaire just after logging into the online shop, and were shown the estimated 
carbon savings before shopping; the other half of the sample completed it at the end of the final 
questionnaire and were not given the estimated savings. In the sample, no participant reported 
zero carbon savings, with an average value of 13,034 gCO2e (median = 12,202 gCO2e). A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the distributions of basket carbon savings in the 
experimental treatments (shown in Figure 4) did not differ significantly from the control group 
with self-image question. The estimated carbon savings in the previous week are only weakly 
correlated with the basket carbon footprint in week 2, with Spearman correlation coefficients 
not significantly different from zero (control treatment: ρ = 0.12, p = 0.40; environmental recall 
treatment: ρ = 0.15, p = 0.30; tax treatment: ρ = -0.18, p = 0.20; environmental recall + tax 
treatment: ρ = -0.05, p = 0.72). Finally, a non-parametric local polynomial regression (Fan and 
Gijbels 1996) shows that carbon reported to be saved the previous week and consumed in the 
current experimental basket may not be related, as their non-parametric relationship is fairly 
flat (Figure 5); however, there might be a link between these metrics for extremely low or 
extremely high values. 
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4.1.3. Environmental self-image  
The moral self-image of the consumer can be an important motivator of moral behaviour, 
because it measures the consumer’s perceived distance from a desired level of morality9 
(Monin and Jordan 2009). Following Jordan et al. (2011), environmental self-image is 
measured as the answer to the question “Compared to the environmentally-friendly person I 
want to be, I am…”, using a 1-9 scale going from “Much less environmentally friendly than 
the person I want to be” (low self-image) to “Much more environmentally-friendly than the 
person I want to be” (centre: “Exactly as environmentally friendly as the person I want to be”). 
As such, we expect a positive correlation between environmental self-image and CO2e 
consumption, ceteris paribus: holding the target moral stock constant, consumers with low 
environmental self-image should be expected to build baskets with less CO2e compared to 
those who behaved exactly as they wished; these in turn would be expected to put less carbon 
footprint in their basket compared to those who report doing better than they wish. To ensure 
the value only referred to the mental state of the consumer prior to any purchase, the self-image 
question was asked before the shopping trip, except for the control with no self-image question 
treatment, who reported it after the experiment10. Table 4 shows that the scores given to the 
environmental self-image question are positively related to other scales: environmental self-
image is related to the symbolization (but not the internalisation) component of environmental 
identity (as in Jordan et al. 2011), as well as, in some treatments, to self-perception. Self-image 
is also negatively correlated to the carbon footprint of a basket, but significantly only for 
participants in the environmental recall and control with social image question treatments in 
week 2 only, or across the whole sample11.  
To explore the functional form of the relationship between environmental self-image and 
carbon footprint further, we ran a non-parametric local polynomial regression of degree 3 (Fan 
and Gijbels 1996). Figure 7a confirms that these two variables are unrelated in all treatments 
in week 1: their relationship is described by a fairly flat line, and an increase in environmental 
                                                          
9 A test of internal validity shows that this metric is fairly stable across time period. In fact, the Spearman rank 
correlations across treatments are as follows: control with social image question = 0.7295, p = 0.000; moral 
licensing = 0.5859 (p = 0.000); tax = 0.7306 (p = 0.000); moral licensing + tax = 0.3069 (p = 0.032). 
10 The position of the environmental self-image question influenced the response given: participants who answered 
this question after shopping (the control with the after self-image question treatment) reported a lower self-image 
compared to the rest of the sample in week 1 (p < 0.05 if tested against all treatments; p < 0.10 if tested against 
the control with social image question treatment only), suggesting that the act of shopping in itself made people 
feel relatively environmentally-unfriendly; the effect is not present in week 2 (p > 0.10 when tested against all 
treatments, as well as when tested against control with social image question treatment only). 
11 The whole sample in this case includes participants in all 5 treatments. The correlation coefficient of the “All 
sample” column in Table 4 remains significant if the two controls are removed, either individually or jointly.   
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self-image effectively has no impact on the carbon footprint of the basket. Figure 7b shows 
that, despite a noticeable increase in variance, these lines remain flat in week 2 with the only 
exception of the recall treatment: for participants who had to assess their past behaviour (and 
faced no tax), an increase in environmental self-image reduces the carbon footprint of the 
basket (though with noise apparent from the upward shift for values of environmental self-
image between 6 and 7). 
4.1.4. The impact of environmental recall and a carbon tax on the carbon 
footprint of food baskets 
The aim of this section is to estimate equation (14) to test the experimental hypotheses on the 
impact of environmental recall and carbon taxation on the consumer carbon footprints, as 
identified in sections 2.3-2.5. Covariates are added progressively to the regressions: a first 
regression adjusts for treatment dummies only (model A); a second regression adds the CO2e 
of the basket in the previous week, to derive an estimate of ρ (model B); a third regression adds 
demographics (gender, age, British nationality) and carbon saved, which are only measured 
once (model C); a fourth regression adds psychological variables (e.g. moral identity scales, 
social desirability scale, and intertemporal discount rate) and knowledge of product carbon 
footprint (all current and lagged) (model D); and a fifth regression adds the logarithm of total 
expenditures (current and lagged) (model E). In these regressions, the environmental recall 
dummy includes all participants in the two treatments with an environmental recall 
questionnaire; the tax dummy includes all participants in the two treatments with a carbon tax; 
while the multiplicative interaction term identifies the joint treatment manipulations effect. 
A first set of regressions (Table 5) uses the natural logarithm of the carbon footprint in 
the second week of shopping as dependent variable. However, while some participants might 
have spent a significant amount of money on price premia to have a full basket with low-carbon 
options, others might have spent little money hence obtaining a low-carbon basket. To address 
the problem, a second set of regressions (Table 6) normalises the carbon footprint by the 
amount of money spent to obtain the ratio ܥ௜ ௜ܻൗ  before a logarithmic transformation. In both 
cases, these transformations lose one participant who did not buy anything in week 2. Section 
4.2.1 compares main effects and interaction effects; in section 4.2, these effects are estimated 
after progressively adding covariates to the analysis.  
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Results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that a carbon tax significantly reduces the carbon 
footprint of the basket12, supporting H2. Environmental recall has a main effect of comparable 
size and indicates a reduction in carbon footprint, consistent with the direction of H1b rather 
than H1a. As a result, the presence of the environmental recall questionnaire before the 
shopping decisions always reduces the carbon footprint of the basket, providing no evidence 
of a licensing effect; however, the consistency effect (i.e. evidence for H1b) is significant only 
when individual heterogeneity is controlled for13. The joint effect is the sum of the two 
individual effects, with no significant interaction between them: the results provide no evidence 
to support H3a and H3b, but rather indicate that carbon taxation does not alter the underlying 
environmental motivation of consumers who are building a basket. In terms of marginal effects, 
carbon taxation reduces the carbon footprint of a food basket by 2.2-5.4 kg CO2e, while 
environmental recall leads to a reduction of 2-3.3 kg CO2e14. Assuming this shop was 
representative of an average weekly shop, the average reduction per household is 281 kg 
CO2e/year for the carbon tax, and 172 kg CO2e/year for the environmental recall questionnaire. 
To put these numbers into perspective, the carbon footprint of one litre of petrol is 3.15 kg 
CO2e, and that of one low-energy lightbulb left on continuously for a year is 90 kg CO2e 
(Berners-Lee 2011). Finally, the tax increased prices by 8.47% (on average), and reduced 
carbon emissions by 12-26%, raising £107.6515; these figures indicate a tax elasticity of 
demand for carbon footprint of -1.4 to -3.1, and a reduction of 21-50 gCO2e/£ of tax earned.  
Results further indicate that age and psychological variables do not predict the 
consumption of carbon footprint in both weeks16. Male participants appear to consume less 
gCO2e/£ across several specifications, while British nationality only affects total CO2e 
consumption before adjusting for attitudes and expenditures. The carbon footprint saved before 
shopping is also positively related to the carbon footprint in the basket (as expected if moral 
licensing occurs), with an elasticity of around 0.1-0.2 that is not significant in any of the 
regressions. Finally, the carbon footprint of week 1 is strongly linked to the carbon footprint of 
week 2, accounting for a strong habitual component in the generation of carbon emissions from 
food purchasing. Our results indicate that demographics and attitudes mostly do not have a 
                                                          
12 The only insignificant coefficient in these tables is slightly above the 10% probability (p=0.164) 
13 The coefficient is close to significant when CO2e is divided by price, with p = 0.119. 
14 The average carbon footprint in the basket in the first week was 20,312 gCO2e; the average carbon footprint in 
the control group in week two was 19.9 kgCO2e.  
15 The average tax paid by the 99 participants in the tax treatments was £1.09, or 6.8% of their £15.97 spend. 
16 The coefficient of week 1 psychological variables, which are key to the identification of equation (19) are not 
significant, and are not reported in this sections to keep tables compact. 
22 
 
major impact on sustainable behaviour, as also observed in previous research using actual sales 
data (Panzone et al. 2016); other than the possible exception of gender, the key factors 
determining present carbon footprints appear to be past consumption, and experimental stimuli. 
Part of the lack of significant effects in these coefficients is possibly due to the relatively small 
sample in the analysis, which limits the efficiency of the estimation due to the unobservable 
heterogeneity in consumer preferences17.  
5. DISCUSSION 
This article explored the impact of recalling previous environmentally-friendly acts and a 
carbon tax on consumer behaviour in online food retailing. Experimental research has recently 
observed that recalling past behaviour produces compensatory effects in line with moral 
licensing (Khan and Dhar 2006; Sachdeva et al. 2009), as well as consistency effects in line 
with self-perception or dissonance reduction approaches (Dickerson et al. 1992; Freedman and 
Fraser 1966). A key question addressed by this research is which of these effects appear in 
complex real life situations where consumers are subjected to a multiplicity of stimuli. In 
addition, current debates on environmental policy support the introduction of a carbon tax, but 
there remain questions on the effectiveness of this intervention due to limited research on this 
topic. This section discusses the implications of our results in light of the existing literature on 
moral decision-making and carbon taxation.  
5.1. The impact of environmental recall on the carbon footprint of a basket 
The first element of this discussion is the relation between recalling past environmentally-
friendly behaviour and the current carbon footprint of the consumer. As discussed previously, 
the environmental recall treatment made the amount of the carbon saved in the previous week 
salient and known exactly (i.e. given the imprecision associated to carbon lifecycle measures). 
Given the link between present and past carbon footprint (equation (7)), the increase in moral 
self-worth θ could have been used immediately, causing moral licensing, or could have been 
stored to raise the stock of pro-environmental self-worth. Results indicate that knowledge of 
                                                          
17 In a further analysis (available upon request), equation (14) was estimated separately for low vs high carbon 
savings (defined as above or below the mean carbon savings of 13,034.44 gCO2e), to test whether the relation 
between past carbon saved on current behaviour might be change slope at different level of consumption (as in 
Figure 5). Results indicate that consumers with large CO2e savings have a negative non-significant relation 
between CO2e saved and CO2e consumed, while consumers with small savings present a positive relation, an 
indication that these consumers might use information on the carbon available to license their behaviour. 
Moreover, the environmental recall questionnaire and the carbon tax appear to have a much stronger impact on 
consumers who saved more carbon before shopping in magnitude. However, these coefficients have large standard 
errors, and are either not significant or the main effects are at best significant at p = 0.10.  
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the amount of carbon saved in the past week reduced the carbon footprint of baskets, an 
indication that consumers did not view this value as a sort of “carbon allowance” for their 
consumption. Previous research already noted that moral self-worth shocks do not always lead 
to moral licensing (Blanken, van de Ven, and Zeelenberg 2015), despite evidence that supports 
the existence of this effect (see Effron and Conway 2015; Miller and Effron 2010; Mullen and 
Monin 2016 for comprehensive reviews of the literature). This article contributes to the 
ongoing debate of whether the recollection of previous pro-environmental behaviour leads to 
compensatory or consistency effects by finding that environmental recall promotes current pro-
environmental behaviour. 
It is worth noting our environmental recall questionnaire used a different measure of 
recall to that used by Sachdeva et al. (2009), where consumers had to write down past pro-
social acts in a free recall task. However, the approach used in this research asked consumers 
to estimate the frequency of pro-environmental behaviours that were presented to them in a 
list, and might have reminded consumers of how much they had not done18, possibly causing 
feelings of inadequacy (the conflict between attitudes and behaviours shown in Dickerson et 
al. 1992). Environmental priming may also have been at work, analogously to how this appears 
to work in other contexts in inducing pro-social behaviour (e.g. Cookson 2000; Elliott et al. 
1998; Liberman et al. 2004). The temporal distance between the time of the choice and the time 
of consumption might have facilitated consistency: environmental recall could have indeed 
motivated the search for immediate gratification, which consumers could not satisfy in an 
online store and satisfied elsewhere (e.g. in another store after the experiment). However, it is 
worth noting that psychological studies that observe evidence for moral licensing tend to use 
hypothetical gratification, suggesting that distance between choice and consumption might not 
be a dominant confounder of these results.  
As exposure to the environmental recall questionnaire reduced the average carbon 
footprint of consumers in the treatment, the amount of carbon saved was not significantly 
linked to carbon consumed. This result could be driven by the existence of a non-linear (rather 
than linear) relationship between these two variables: Figure 5 shows that a linear relationship 
between these metrics might exist only for those consumers who saved very little CO2e (a 
positive relationship, i.e. moral licensing), and for those who saved large quantities of CO2e (a 
negative relationship, i.e. moral consistency). This effect on extreme values did not appear in 
                                                          
18 No consumer engaged in all the measured environmental activities (see Table 1).  
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consumers who had recalled past behaviour. However, the number of participants in this 
experiment is too low to allow for further analysis on this functional relationship at the 
extremes of the distribution of carbon savings, something that should be considered in future 
research. Notably, the literature on moral licensing indicates that moral credentials, but not 
moral credits, are context-specific (Miller and Effron 2010); however, these results indicate 
that the carbon footprint from food choices is not seen as clearly mentally relatable to the 
carbon footprint of non-food items included in the environmental recall questionnaire; in other 
words, consumers do not see the carbon footprint from different behaviours as perfectly 
equivalent to the carbon footprint in the food basket.  
Equally surprising is the lack of a clear relationship between environmental self-image 
and environmental behaviour. Theories of moral self-regard view the distance to the ideal 
moral-self as a key factor in driving moral behaviour (Monin and Jordan 2009). This relation 
should exist in all treatments (including the two control groups), and should be stronger under 
psychological stimuli that increase salience of the distance between actual and ideal moral self 
(as in the recall treatment above), or, more generally, interventions that activate concerns of 
being below the ideal moral self. However, results fail to find a clear link between 
environmental self-image and carbon footprint: the rank correlation (Table 4) is significant 
only for consumers who were reminded of their past behaviour and the control group with self-
image question asked before the shopping task (in week 2 only). Similarly, Figures 7a and 7b 
show that the environmental self-image scale may be negatively related to behaviour only for 
participants in the environmental recall treatment in week 2, with a functional relationship 
characterised by a flat line in all other week-treatment combinations. However, given limited 
statistical power, future research will need to verify the robustness of this result.  
5.2. The impact of a carbon tax on the carbon footprint of a basket 
A second experimental treatment tested the viability of a carbon tax as a means to reduce the 
carbon footprint of food baskets. Results indicate that sufficiently high carbon taxes (£70/tonne 
CO2e, in line with directives from DECC (2016), and equivalent to an average increase of 
8.47% in market prices) are effective in changing consumption to lower carbon footprints. The 
introduction of the carbon tax showed a significant potential for carbon reduction in a context 
where expenditures were real, with baskets containing 2-5 kg CO2e less than the control group 
(12-25% reductions). This strongly significant effect is fairly stable across model 
specifications. Because the revenues from the tax were redistributed to participants in the tax 
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treatment (who were clearly notified before they started shopping), these results purely refer to 
consumer switching to now cheaper low-carbon options rather than consuming less (no income 
effects). This reduction might have been facilitated by the easy access to close substitutes in 
the shop (e.g. smaller sizes of the same good, or low-carbon options); this result might not be 
replicable in contexts or choice sets where substitution is complex, either because a direct low-
carbon substitute does not exist, or because consumers do not perceive an existing substitute 
as easy to use or consume (e.g. shifting from meat to a vegetarian meat substitute). The effect 
of the carbon tax also added significantly to the effect of the environmental recall questionnaire. 
This additional response is summative, not multiplicative: the two effects do not cancel each 
other, but jointly work in the marketplace; however there is no synergy between them, an 
indication that consumers do not associate these two stimuli. 
In the experiment, the carbon tax was simplified to the extent that it imposed a full pass-
through of the tax: the price of the good increased perfectly by the amount of the tax, with no 
adjustments of the supply side of the market (e.g. Kenkel 2005). If retailers can adjust their 
prices to absorb part of the price increase (e.g. by switching to cheaper suppliers), then the 
effect of the tax would be lower than we observed in this article. At the same time, the design 
of the experiment clearly informed consumers of the presence of a carbon tax, both explaining 
its presence before consumers entered the store, and announcing the amount next to the price 
of each product in store. Consumers may have used the tax as information on the environmental 
quality of each product, as well as on the interest of the policymaker in discouraging the 
consumption of certain products (McAdams 1997; Sunstein and Reisch 2014). To this extent, 
research has shown that taxes advertised to consumers may have an additional behavioural 
effect beyond the pure price effect (see Zizzo et al. 2016). Nevertheless, given the absence of 
the carbon tax in the actual marketplace, the direct reference to a carbon tax was used to ensure 
participants could access information on the tax relatively easily during a time-consuming task 
like shopping in a new and unfamiliar supermarket.  
The strong response observed in the results is an indication that consumers are very 
sensitive to food price increases. In fact, results suggest that consumers found adjustments in 
this sector relatively simple to obtain, responding significantly to the change in prices. 
However, consumers might be more price sensitive in a laboratory experiment, particularly 
when the can substitute behaviour in a taxed environment with unobserved behaviour without 
taxes outside of the laboratory: consumers might refuse to buy a product more easily, knowing 
they can source it later in a different store. This difference in price sensitivity is an empirical 
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research question that should be tested in future research to validate the results from 
experimental research. Finally, while this study did not formally assess the acceptance of the 
carbon tax in the marketplace, results clearly indicate that a carbon tax can be a viable and 
effective tool for or reducing food-related carbon emissions.  
5.3. The quest for consistency in the construction of sustainable food baskets 
As phenomena like moral licensing gained increasing attention lately in academic and policy 
arenas, a key policy question is how consumers can be motivated to construct sustainable food 
baskets consistently over time (Joosten et al. 2014; Mullen and Monin 2016). Results in this 
article indicate that policy can motivate consistency in sustainable online food shopping: 
conventional policy tools like carbon taxes motivated consumers to reduce their carbon 
footprint, with sizeable reductions purely driven by the change in relative prices, and without 
altering the psychological mind-set of consumers. Conceivably, other price-based interventions 
from marketing (discounts) or public policy (subsidies) can lead to similar effects and facilitate 
the transition to low-carbon food shopping. Apart from conventional policy instruments, 
behavioural interventions can also reduce the carbon footprint of the consumer (McAdams 
1997; Sunstein and Reisch 2014). Results in this article indicate that nudges (such as just 
encouraging people to think of their recent environmental behaviour) can reduce the footprint 
of the basket by altering the psychological incentives and disincentives that motivate 
consumers. These effects remain when the nudge is presented in combination with a traditional 
policy instrument that modifies prices. The interaction between nudges and traditional policy 
instruments is currently understudied (Sunstein and Reisch 2014), and could be developed to 
design effective social marketing campaigns, particularly targeting consumers with different 
levels of environmental engagement in a different manner.  
As with most behavioural and experimental literature, it remains unclear whether the 
effect of these interventions wears out over time. In fact, depending on the intervention being 
considered, the policymaker might either maintain the policy mechanism (as commonly done 
for taxes) or remove it (as is the case of exogenous shocks or experimental research in a lab). 
The addition of a long-term perspective raises questions on the long term effectiveness of a 
policy instrument (see e.g. Dolan, Galizzi, and Navarro-Martinez 2015). For instance, 
consumers might become used to the price increase caused by the carbon tax, adapting to the 
new set of prices over time. At the same time, a dynamic tax that is periodically updated to 
represent the price of carbon over time could prevent this behavioural adaptation. A study of 
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the long term impact of a policy would require the observation of a panel of consumers over a 
number of time periods in a controlled environment or in existing commercial panels, with 
periodically changing regulatory set-up. Further research could explore this dynamics.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This article tested for the presence for the role of environmental recall and carbon taxation on 
the sustainability of food shopping using incentive-compatible experimental data. Using an 
online supermarket, the experiment showed that a carbon tax has a strong impact on the carbon 
footprint of the basket. When controlling for individual heterogeneity, we also find evidence 
that the act of recalling past behaviour also motivated the formation of low-carbon baskets. Our 
research indicates policy directions that could be explored to reduce consumers’ carbon 
footprint. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Screenshot of the online retailer  
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Figure 2: Diagrammatic representation of the experiment 
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Figure 3: Changes in average basket carbon footprint across time period, by treatment  
  
Note: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions – Control: D = 0.1348 
(corrected p = 0.803); Environmental recall: D = 0.2157 (corrected p = 0.136); Environmental recall + Tax: D = 
0.2245 (corrected p = 0.122); Tax Only:  D = 0.1800 (corrected p = 0.316).  
 
Figure 4: Changes in average basket carbon footprint across time period, by presence vs 
absence of a self-image question before the shopping task 
  
Note: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution – Control with self-image question: D = 
0.125 (corrected p = 0.803); Control with the after self-image question: D = 0.161 (corrected p = 0.815). 
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Figure 5: Distribution of estimated carbon savings by treatment  
  
Note: A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that, relative to the control treatment, treatments do not 
have significantly different distributions: tax treatment (D = 0.1376, p-value = 0.665); environmental recall 
treatment (D = 0.1581, p-value = 0.48); environmental recall + tax treatment (D = 0.0816, p-value = 0.99). Median 
carbon savings did not differ across these treatments (median test, F2(3) = 2.3697, p = 0.50).  
 
Figure 6: Relation between estimated carbon savings and carbon footprint in the basket 
a) Environmental recall before shopping          b) Environmental recall after shopping 
 
Note: Graphs based on a local polynomial regression estimation with degree 3 and Epanechnikov kernel. Graphs 
exclude one observation in each graph with ln(Carbon savings)<7, to retain visual clarity in the output.  
0
5.
0e
-0
5
1.
0e
-0
4
1.
5e
-0
4
0
5.
0e
-0
5
1.
0e
-0
4
1.
5e
-0
4
0 10000 20000 30000 0 10000 20000 30000
Control - SI Moral Recall
Tax Tax + Moral Recall
D
en
si
ty
Carbon savings, week 1
6
8
10
12
8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5
Carbon savings (logarithmic form)
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 3, bandwidth = .81, pwidth = 1.22
4
6
8
10
12
8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5
Carbon savings (logarithmic form)
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 3, bandwidth = .57, pwidth = .86
32 
 
 
Figure 7: Relation between environmental self-image (x-axis) and carbon footprint in the 
basket (y-axis), by week and treatment  
a) Week 1 
 
b) Week 2 
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Note: graphs refer to a degree 3 local polynomial regression with Gaussian kernel. Number of observations for 
each treatment can be found in Table 2.   
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TABLES 
Table 1: List of environmental activities measured in the moral licensing task 
Act/Frequency g CO2e Units  
Eaten a standard 10g portion of margarine rather than the same amount of butter  81 10 g 
Used my own bag for shopping instead of using a plastic bag supplied by the 
retailer 
10 Bag 
Eaten 100g of meat substitutes rather than 100g of beef 
100g of meat equalso: a 5oz rump steak; just over a portion of Sunday roast 
 (three thin-cut slices of roast = 90g); or a bit more than one quarter-pounder 
beefburger (= 78g). 
215.7 100 g 
Took a shorter (2-minute) shower than the UK average (8-minute) 540 Shower 
Walked rather than driven to go to University  106 Km 
Cycled rather than driven to go to University 106 Km 
Walked rather than took public transport to go to University  93.3 Km 
Cycled rather than took public transport to go to University  -86.719 Km 
Washed clothing at 30 degrees rather than 60 degrees 360 Wash 
Turned off your laptop completely rather than leaving it on standby 4.4 Day 
Turned off your TV completely rather than leaving it on standby 4.4 Day 
Turned off the tap when brushing teeth 13.5 Times 
Did not waste any of the food on my plate when eating in a meal.  480 Plate 
Recycled one plastic bottles 44.5 Bottle 
Recycled one aluminium can  70 Can 
Put an old newspaper in the recycling bin instead of the garbage bin 225 Newspaper 
Put an old magazine in the recycling bin instead of the garbage bin 600 Magazine 
Recycled the equivalent of one 750-ml glass bottle (typical size of a wine bottle) 73.9 750 ml bottle 
Recycled the equivalent of one 500-ml glass bottle (typical size of a one-pint beer 
or milk bottle) 
112 500 ml bottle 
Recycled the equivalent of one 330-ml glass bottle (typical size of a small beer 
bottle) 
168 330 ml bottle 
I turned off unnecessary lights in my home (enter number of days) 665.7 Day 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 This value adds the carbon emissions associated to a shower straight after cycling.  
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Table 2: Summary demographics of the sample by treatment 
 
Control –  
After  
self-image  
question 
Control – 
Self-image 
Moral  
recall 
Tax  Moral  
Recall x  
Tax 
F2 
Male 0.23 0.31 0.37 0.34 0.41 3.296 
         S. D. 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.50  
Age 24.89 23.38 24.40 24.80 23.36 1.777 
         S. D. 9.88 4.64 6.73 5.91 4.18  
British  0.55 0.49 0.67 0.46 0.33 9.094* 
         S. D. 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.47  
Member of Environmental  
Association 
0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.179 
         S. D. 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.24  
CO2e Savings (g) (week 2) 13,133  12,774 13,386 13,004 12,898 0.776 
         S. D. 4,844 4,992 5,430 5,310 4,663  
Observations 31 49 51 50 49  
 Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. Note: Chi2 refers to the critical value of a Kruskal-
Wallis Test comparing demographics across group.  
 
Table 3: Summary basket statistics per treatment and week 
 
 Week Control –  
After self-
image 
question 
Control – 
Self-image 
Moral  
recall 
Tax Environmental 
recall  
+Tax 
F2 
Expenditures  Mean 1 19.18 17.73 17.63 17.47 17.02 1.422 
(£)  S. D.  5.90 7.29 6.81 7.12 7.33   
Mean 2 18.25 16.58 16.48 16.59 15.33 2.262 
  S. D.  6.31 7.45 7.47 8.06 8.31  
 Diff.  -0.93 -1.15 -1.15 -0.88 -1.69 0.277 
CO2 footprint  Mean 1 19,142 21,381 21,494  19,258 19,347  2.492 
(gCO2e) S. D.  8,808 1,491 1,548 1,461 1,471  
 Mean 2 17,722 19,878 19,118 16,404 15,120 7.142 
 S. D.  7,208 1,319 1,634 1,346 1,406  
 Diff.  -1,404 -1,503 -2,376** -2,854 -4,227* 8.784* 
Moral  Mean 1 3.68 4.18 4.33 4.18 4.29 4.576 
Self-Image S. D.  1.51 1.69 1.51 1.59 1.57  
 Mean 2 3.87 4.18 4.29 4.30 4.61 2.994 
 S. D.  1.02 1.45 1.51 1.68 1.73  
 Diff.  0.19 0 -0.04 0.12 0.32 3.582 
Observations  
 
31 49 51 50 49 
 
Note: A significant estimate in week 2 refer to a Median test of the difference between the median of the 
distributions in Week 2 and Week 1. F2 refers to the critical value of a Kruskal-Wallis Test comparing behaviour 
and self-image across the five groups. Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.     
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Table 4: Spearman correlations between environmental self-image and related variables. 
Week Variable  Control – 
After Soc. 
Image 
Control 
– Social 
Image 
Recall Tax Tax + 
Recall 
All 
Sample 
1 Self-perception 1 0.341 0.582*** 0.462*** 0.362 0.463*** 0.444***  
Self-perception 2 0.149 0.446** 0.237 0.231 0.394* 0.294***  
Moral Obligation 0.060 0.184 0.138 0.083 0.220 0.131  
Identity – Symbolisation 0.239 0.633*** 0.276 0.318 0.374 0.367*** 
Identity – Internalisation    -0.096 0.060 0.050 0.201 0.158 0.078  
CO2e consumed -0.110 -0.106 -0.283 -0.182 0.010 -0.131  
CO2e Saved 0.160 -0.008 0.048 0.029 0.015 0.032 
2 Self-perception 1 0.289 0.480*** 0.283 0.203 0.199 0.284***  
Self-perception 2 0.103 0.490*** 0.144 0.373 0.414** 0.307***  
Moral Obligation 0.028 0.183 -0.087 -0.004 0.110 0.050  
Identity – Symbolisation 0.563** 0.498*** 0.421** 0.245 0.424** 0.412***  
Identity – Internalisation    0.251 0.006 0.068 0.169 0.000 0.055  
CO2e consumed -0.098 -0.385** -0.305* -0.115 -0.204 -0.221***  
CO2e Saved 0.327 -0.162 0.187 0.071 0.174 0.087 
Note: significance is based on p-values after a Bonferroni adjustment, regressing multiple correlations of carbon 
variables and psychometric variables separately for consistency in the adjustment. Variables refer to the 
answer/agreement to the following statements: Self-perception 1 – I think my behaviour is environmentally 
responsible (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree); Self-perception 2 – When I buy a product, I take 
environmental considerations into account (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree); Moral obligation scale – I feel 
morally obliged to protect the environment (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree).  
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Table 5: Regression estimates of the impact of treatments on the CO2e of the basket (week 2) 
Model A B C D E  
Main effects &  
interaction  
A + Past 
Consumption 
B + 
demographics 
C + 
Attitudes 
D + 
Expenditures 
Intercept† 9.7649*** 9.4729 -0.3901 -1.8110 4.9319*** 
          S.E. 0.0965 0.2918 8.2472 7.8810 1.8295 
Environmental recall -0.1556 -0.1370 -0.1709* -0.1842** -0.1575** 
          S.E. 0.1487 0.0940 0.0876 0.0918 0.0717 
Tax -0.3051** -0.1534** -0.1561** -0.1111 -0.1178* 
          S.E. 0.1537 0.0691 0.0725 0.0794 0.0604 
Environmental recall x Tax -0.1179 -0.0685 0.0010 -0.0098 -0.0198 
          S.E. 0.2576 0.1619 0.1565 0.1623 0.1012 
ln(CO2)t-1 - 0.8247*** 0.8101*** 0.7869*** 0.5452*** 
          S.E.  0.0576 0.0560 0.0651 0.1272 
Male† - - -0.6642 -0.6080 -0.0391** 
          S.E.   0.5047 0.4549 0.1761 
Age† - - 0.0342 0.0329 0.0059 
          S.E.   0.0359 0.0336 0.0116 
British† - - 0.9515 0.5621 0.0733 
          S.E.   0.4658 0.4788 0.1416 
ln(CO2e saved) † - - 0.9430 1.0105 0.2068 
          S.E.   0.8905 0.7618 0.1789 
Identity – Symbolisation - - - 0.0543 0.0091 
          S.E.  
  
0.0943 0.0566 
Identity – Internalisation  - - - 0.0641 -0.0305 
          S.E.  
  
0.0768 0.0456 
Social Desirability Scale - - - -0.0200 -0.0141 
          S.E.  
  
0.0223 0.0132 
CO2 footprint knowledge - - - 0.0304 0.0187 
          S.E.  
  
0.0313 0.0249 
Discount rate - - - 0.1806 -0.0505 
          S.E.  
  
0.3035 0.1708 
Self-perception 1 - - - 0.0260 0.0442 
          S.E.  
  
0.0509 0.0361 
Self-perception 2 - - - -0.0229 0.0386 
          S.E.  
  
0.0426 0.0303 
Ln(expenditures) - - - - 0.9455*** 
          S.E.  
   
-0.1265 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 
R2 0.0530 0.6260 0.6490 0.668 0.862 
Adjusted R2 0.0380 0.6180 0.6340 0.626 0.842 
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Marginal effects:  
    
Environmental recall -2,757.67 -2428.76 -3028.82 -3264.33 -2792.66 
          S.E. 1,584.64 1395.64 1740.45 1875.79 1604.75 
Tax -5,408.39 -2719.02 -2767.02 -1969.11 -2088.35 
          S.E. 3,107.83 1562.43 1590.02 1131.51 1200.03 
Environmental recall x Tax -2,089.53 -1213.46 17.40 -173.32 -350.60 
          S.E. 1,200.71 697.29 10.00 99.60 201.47 
Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. S.E. refers to robust standard. For variables identified 
with †, the value in the table refers to the estimated coefficient divided by (1-ρ), as from equation (17), and the 
relative standard errors have been estimated using the Delta method. Self-perception variables refer to the 
agreement to the following statements: Self-perception 1 – I think my behaviour is environmentally responsible 
(1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree); Self-perception 2 – When I buy a product, I take environmental 
considerations into account (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree). 
 
Table 6: Regression estimates of the impact of treatments on the CO2/£ of the basket (week 2) 
Model A B C D E  
Main effects &  
interaction 
A + Past 
consumption 
B + 
demographics 
C + 
Attitudes 
D + 
Expenditures 
Intercept† 7.0802*** 7.1088*** 5.4206*** 5.0781*** 4.9237*** 
          S.E. 0.0450 0.0780 1.4749 1.6794 1.8200 
Environmental recall -0.1196 -0.1158* -0.1185* -0.1566** -0.1588** 
          S.E. 0.0763 0.0653 0.0641 0.0711 0.0718 
Tax -0.2060*** -0.1362** -0.1284** -0.1184* -0.1183* 
          S.E. 0.0647 0.0557 0.0563 0.0605 0.0604 
Environmental recall x Tax -0.0102 -0.0561 -0.0382 -0.0209 -0.0199 
          S.E. 0.1213 0.1043 0.0978 0.0999 0.1013 
ln(CO2)t-1 - 0.5014*** 0.5283*** 0.5281*** 0.5404*** 
          S.E.  0.1601 0.1549 0.1501 0.1282 
Male† - - -0.3378* -0.3840** -0.3875** 
          S.E.  
 
0.1786 0.1774 0.1744 
Age† - - 0.0026 0.0049 0.0059 
          S.E.  
 
0.0101 0.0112 0.0115 
British† - - 0.1157 0.0570 0.0746 
          S.E.  
 
0.1171 0.1305 0.1405 
ln(CO2e saved) † - - 0.1794 0.1830 0.2063 
          S.E.  
 
0.1599 0.1666 0.1779 
Identity – Symbolisation - - - 0.0071 0.0090 
          S.E.  
  
0.0559 0.0568 
Identity – Internalisation  - - - -0.0376 -0.0316 
          S.E.  
  
0.0496 0.0458 
Social Desirability Scale - - - -0.0137 -0.0140 
          S.E.  
  
0.0131 0.0132 
CO2footprint knowledge - - - 0.0186 0.0196 
          S.E.  
  
0.0247 0.0250 
Discount rate - - - -0.0681 -0.0512 
39 
 
          S.E.  
  
0.1649 0.1713 
Self-perception 1 - - - 0.0457 0.0440 
          S.E.  
  
0.0359 0.0362 
Self-perception 2 - - - 0.0422 0.0387 
          S.E.  0.0306 0.0304 
Ln(expenditures) - - - - -0.0616 
          S.E.  
   
-0.1272 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 
R2 0.0760 0.2760 0.3180 0.385 0.389 
Adjusted R2 0.0620 0.2610 0.2890 0.308 0.304 
Marginal effects:  
    
Environmental recall -2,120.63 -2052.71 -2100.58 -2775.24 -2815.39 
          S.E. 1,218.58 1179.55 1207.06 1594.74 1617.81 
Tax -3,651.35 -2414.32 -2276.39 -2097.95 -2096.38 
          S.E. 2,098.18 1387.34 1308.08 1205.55 1204.64 
Environmental recall x Tax -180.51 -993.58 -676.74 -370.30 -353.17 
          S.E. 103.73 570.94 388.88 212.79 202.94 
Significance is as follows: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. S.E. refers to robust standard. For variables identified 
with †, the value in the table refers to the estimated coefficient divided by (1-ρ), as from equation (17), and the 
relative standard errors have been estimated using the Delta method. Self-perception variables refer to the 
agreement to the following statements: Self-perception 1 – I think my behaviour is environmentally responsible 
(1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree); Self-perception 2 – When I buy a product, I take environmental 
considerations into account (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree). 
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THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RECALL AND CARBON TAXATION ON 
THE CARBON FOOTPRINT OF SUPERMARKET SHOPPING 
ONLINE APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for your participation to this research. With your answers we are trying to 
understand what drives consumer choices, and how these factors determine what consumers 
buy during a grocery shopping trip. All the information you give us will be completely 
confidential: we will give you an anonymous ID code, and no one (including the investigato r) 
will know the information in the data belongs to you. The data will be subject to statistica l 
analysis and will be stored indefinitely in a safe repository inaccessible to anyone outside the 
research team. 
In this research, you will be assigned a virtual weekly budget of £20 to spend on grocery 
shopping online. You can spend as much of this in our virtual shop as you wish. It is important 
that you make choices as you would in any shopping trip you make. At the end of each week, 
we will select randomly 1 participant to the experiment in every 5, i.e. 20% of participants. 
These selected participants will actually receive the goods they ordered in their online shopping 
trip and receive in cash the balance of the £20 not spent in the chosen week. Please notice that 
while we source our products from Tesco stores for convenience, Tesco has no involvement in 
this research.
In addition, every participant will receive £5 as recognition of the time spent in taking part in 
this research. This money, which is guaranteed to you, is independent on what you purchase or 
the answers you give. You will receive the £5 at the end of the second week.
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After completion of the experiment, you will also be able to withdraw within six weeks of your 
last visit by contacting Dr Luca Panzone, School of Agricultural, Food and Rural Development, 
Newcastle University, phone: 0191 2083594, e-mail: l.a.panzone@newcastle.ac.uk and 
quoting your ID code. 
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CONSENT FORM
Please tick all in order to proceed. You can ask for details of points you do not wish to tick to 
the Research Assistant. 
I have read and understood the information in the Information Sheet. o
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my 
participation.
o
I understand that in compensation for my time I will receive £5 for 2 weeks of survey.
I will receive this money at the end of the second survey. o
I understand that I will be given a notional £25 budget each week and asked to make 
purchases in the online shop; I can spend as much or as little as I choose provided it is 
within the £25 budget.
o
I understand that I will receive one of my two chosen basket of goods and the money I 
have not spent in the same week, in which case I will accept the items I purchased. o
I understand that all the anonymised information deriving from the experiments will be 
completely confidential and the data will be stored indefinitely in a safe repository of 
Newcastle University.
o
I understand that I can withdraw at any point during this research, including after 
completion by contacting Luca Panzone within 6 weeks of my last visit. o
I understand that the anonymised data will be used for publication of the outcomes of 
this research, and I agree that the data can be used in this way.
ż
We take your decision to answer the questions to be an acknowledgement that you have had 
the terms of your participation adequately explained and that you give your consent. For further 
information, you are welcome to contact Dr Luca Panzone at any time using the contact details 
indicated above.
I accept the terms and conditions (Yes/No)
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Environmental recall questionnaire (when applicable)
Please pause one moment and think about the activities you have done in the past week (i.e. the 
past 7 days) to help protect the natural environment for you and for others. How often have you 
done any of these during the last week? (randomised order)
Act/Frequency Please specify the 
number of occasions:
Never
Eaten a standard 10g portion of margarine rather than the same amount of butter ___________times o
Used my own bag for shopping instead of using a plastic bag supplied by the 
retailer when shopping
___________times o
Did not waste any of the food on my plate when eating in a meal. ___________times o
Eaten 100g of meat substitutes rather than 100g of beef
100g of meat equals to: a 5oz rump steak; just over a portion of Sunday roast 
(three thin-cut slices of roast = 90g); or a bit more than one quarter-pounder 
beefburger (= 78g).
___________times o
Took a shorter (2-minute) shower than the UK average (8-minute) ___________times o
Walked rather than driven to go to University ___________times o
Cycled rather than driven to go to University ___________times o
Walked rather than took public transport to go to University ___________times o
Cycled rather than took public transport to go to University ___________times o
Washed clothing at 30 degrees rather than 60 degrees ___________times o
Turned off your laptop completely rather than leaving it on standby ___________times o
Turned off your TV completely rather than leaving it on standby ___________times o
Turned off the tap when brushing teeth ___________times o
Recycled one aluminium can ___________times o
Put an old newspaper in the recycling bin instead of the garbage bin ___________times o
Put an old magazine in the recycling bin instead of the garbage bin ___________times o
Recycled the equivalent of one 750-ml glass bottle (this is the typical size of a 
wine bottle)
___________times o
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Recycled the equivalent of one 500-ml glass bottle (this is the typical size of a 
one-pint beer or milk bottle)
___________times o
Recycled the equivalent of one 330-ml glass bottle (this is the typical size of a 
small beer bottle)
___________times o
Recycled one plastic bottles ___________times o
I turned off unnecessary lights in my home (enter number of days) ___________times o
Please indicate the distance between your house and the University: ______________
If over the past week you have done any other actions not in the table above that involved effort 
and time to help protect the environment, please use the box below to give a short description 
of these actions, indicating the amount of time (in minutes) you dedicated to them.
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Over the past week by carrying out these acts you have saved [VALUE TO BE DISPLAYED] 
grams of carbon footprint. 
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Moral self-image scale (Jordan, Leliveld, and Tenbrunsel, 2011)
Compared to the environmentally-friendly person I want to be, I am:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Much less environmentally 
friendly than the person I want 
to be
Exactly as environmentally 
friendly as the person I want 
to be
Much more environmentally 
friendly than the person I 
want to be
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CHECK OUT OF SHOPPING TRIP
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Inventory: 
How much of the following food do you currently have in your home? 
I never buy 
this product
I am currently
running low 
I currently 
I have enough
Pulses o o o
Bottled Water, Fruit Juice, and Soft Drinks o o o
Oil, margarine, and butter o o o
Cheese, milk, and other dairy products o o o
Fish o o o
Bread and bakery products o o o
Meat o o o
Vegetables (fresh, frozen, and canned) o o o
Fruit o o o
Rice and Pasta o o o
Breakfast Cereal o o o
Eggs o o o
Non-Dairy Milk o o o
Salt, Sugar o o o
Tea, Coffee o o o
Sauces (e.g. mustard, ketchup) o o o
Honey and Jam o o o
Flour o o o
Willingness to Pay Question
Suppose you consume 1000 KWh or electricity bill a year. This amount of energy costs you £ 
120/year, and generates 500kg of carbon emissions. You receive a leaflet from another 
electricity supplier of comparable quality who can give you the same electricity, but generated 
from more renewable sources than your current supplier. Changing to this new supplier would 
reduce the carbon generated by your 1000 KWh electricity consumption by 20%; so by 
switching you would save 100kg of carbon without reducing your electricity use. 
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However, this change will increase the cost of your initial bill. How much more would you be 
willing to pay on top of the £120 a year you currently pay for electricity to reduce the carbon 
footprint of your electricity consumption by 100kg?
£ ____________
Self-control (Zauberman et al. 2009)
Imagine receiving a gift certificate worth £50, valid from today. How much would you need to 
be paid to wait before using the gift certificate for: 
x 1 year: _____________
Pro-environmental Attitudes (Cornelissen et al. 2008) (1=very negative, 7=very positive)
x How do you feel about environmental behaviours? 
x How do you feel about performing environmental behaviours? 
x How important is it that you perform environmental behaviours? 
Self-perception scale (Cornelissen et al. 2008) (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree)
x I think my behaviour is environmentally responsible 
x When I buy a product, I take environmental considerations into account. 
Moral obligation scale (Cornelissen et al. 2008) (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree)
x I feel morally obliged to protect the environment 
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Moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002) (1=totally don't agree, 7=totally agree)
1. Caring for the environment is an important part of who I am. 
2. I often buy products that communicate the fact that I care for the environment 
3. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as caring 
for the environment. 
4. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as caring for the environment. 
5. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I care for the 
environment. 
6. It would make me feel good to be a person who cares for the environment. 
7. A big part of my emotional well-being is tied up in caring for the environment.
8. I would be ashamed to be a person who cares for the environment. (R)
9. Caring for the environment is not really important to me. (R)
10. Caring for the environment is an important part of my sense of self.
11. I strongly desire to care for the environment.
12. I often wear clothes that identify me as caring for the environment. 
13. The fact that I care for the environment is communicated to others by my membership 
in certain organizations.
Social Desirability Scale (short version) (Stöber 2001)
Please read each statement carefully and decide if that statement describes you or not. If it 
describes you, check the word "true"; if not, check the word "false". 
True False
I sometimes litter. o o
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I always admit my mistakes openly and face the potential negative consequences. o o
In traffic I am always polite and considerate of others. o o
I have tried illegal drugs (for example, marijuana, cocaine, etc.). o o
I always accept others' opinions, even when they don't agree with my own. o o
I take out my bad moods on others now and then. o o
There has been an occasion when I took advantage of someone else. o o
In conversations I always listen attentively and let others finish their sentences. o o
I never hesitate to help someone in case of emergency. o o
When I have made a promise, I keep it--no ifs, ands or buts. o o
I occasionally speak badly of others behind their back. o o
I would never live off other people. o o
I always stay friendly and courteous with other people, even when I am stressed out. o o
During arguments I always stay objective and matter-of-fact. o o
There has been at least one occasion when I failed to return an item that I borrowe d. o o
I always eat a healthy diet. o o
Sometimes I only help because I expect something in return. o o
Environmental Literacy (objectives: 1) to test if people pay more attention to footprint; 2) to 
test if people have prior knowledge of carbon footprint)
x Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (also in store)
(2 litres of Cola in 1 plastic bottle; 2 litres of Cola in six 330-ml cans; Both the same; Not 
sure/Don’t know).
x Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (also in store)
(A pack of 6 own-labelled organic eggs; a pack of 6 own-labelled free-range eggs; Both 
the same; Not sure/Don’t know).
x Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (also in store)
(A pint of whole milk; A pint of skimmed milk; both the same; Not sure/Don’t know)
x Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (also in store)
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(1 litre of Orange Juice not-from-concentrate; 1 litre of Orange Juice from-concentrate; 
both the same; Not sure/Don’t know)
x Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (not in store)
(A 500g portion of Chicken Biryani; A 500g portion of Shepherd's Pie; both the same; Not 
sure/Don’t know) 
x Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (not in store)
(One Thin Crust Cheese Feast Pizza; One Thin Crust Pepperoni Pizza; Both the same; Not 
sure/Don’t know)
x Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (not in store)
(1 litre of lager beer in two 500ml cans; 1 litre of lager beer in four 250ml bottles; both the 
same; Not sure/Don’t know)
x Which of these products do you think is higher in carbon footprint? (not in store)
(A standard 250-ml cup of latte; A standard 250-ml cup of cappuccino; Both the same; Not 
sure/Don’t know)
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You are:    
 Male  Female
Your age group:
 18-25
 26-35
 36-45
 46-55
 More than 55
Your nationality: ______________________
Year of Study
 Year 1
 Year 2
 Year 3
 Master course
 PhD
Faculty of Study
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 Science, Agriculture, and Engineering
 Humanities and Social Science
 Medical Science
How would you describe your ethnicity?
 White 
 Mixed 
 Asian or Asian British 
 Black or Black British 
 Chinese or other ethnic group 
 Others – please specify: ________________________________________
What is your religion?
 Christian
 Jewish
 Muslim
 Hindu
 Buddhist
 None (atheist or agnostic)
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 Others – please specify: ________________________________________
What political party do you support or identify with?
 Conservative Party
 Labour Party 
 Green Party 
 Liberal Democrats 
 Others – please specify: ___________________
Membership of an environmental association
Are you a member of an environmental association (e.g. Friends of the Earth, WWF)? If yes, 
please specify: _______________
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APPENDIX 1. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCALES
1) ENVIRONMENTAL IDENTITY SCALE
To estimate the moral identity scale, the approach follows (Aquino and Reed 2002).
Specifically, participants had to identify their agreement with a list of statement associated to 
being “environmentally-friendly” as the only personal characteristic. Answers were then 
analysed using a principal component analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation after recoding the 
two negative statements (“I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characterist ics” 
and “Having these characteristics is not really important to me”). Results are reported in table 
A1 below, and mirror the results presented in Aquino and Reed (2002). In particular, the PCA 
obtains 2 factors: a first factor consists of six items that measure the internalisation of pro-
environmental identity, the extent by which this identity is central to the self-concept of the 
respondent; while a second factor of seven items measures the symbolisation of pro-
environmental identity, which measures the degree to which the respondent feels this identity 
is reflected in his actions and behaviours. The variables used in the final regression refer to the 
estimated Bartlett score from the PCA. 
Table A1: Rotated factor loadings from the PCA
Week 2 Week 1
Symbolisation Internalisation Symbolisation Internalisation
1 Caring for the environment is an 
important part of who I am. 
0.4858 0.7078 0.5525 0.6126
2 I often buy products that communicate 
the fact that I care for the environment 
0.6320 0.4718 0.5535 0.4099
3 The types of things I do in my spare 
time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me 
as caring for the environment. 
0.8161 0.3108 0.7816 0.2082
4 The kinds of books and magazines that 
I read identify me as caring for the 
environment. 
0.8255 0.2468 0.7133 0.2964
5 I am actively involved in activities that 
communicate to others that I care for 
the environment. 
0.8615 0.1869 0.8333 0.2157
18 
 
6 It would make me feel good to be a 
person who cares for the environment. 
0.1062 0.7824 0.2471 0.6778
7 A big part of my emotional well-being  
is tied up in caring for the environment. 
0.6573 0.5562 0.7398 0.4541
8 I would be ashamed to be a person who 
cares for the environment. (Reverse-
coded)
-0.4474 0.4027 -0.4545 0.5631
9 Caring for the environment is not 
really important to me. (Reverse-
coded)
0.0394 0.7226 0.1487 0.7427
10 Caring for the environment is an 
important part of my sense of self. 
0.6050 0.5700 0.6785 0.5021
11 I strongly desire to care for the 
environment.
0.2971 0.8226 0.4774 0.6073
12 I often wear clothes that identify me as 
caring for the environment. 
0.8159 0.0679 0.7696 0.0113
13 The fact that I care for the environment 
is communicated to others by my 
membership in certain organizations.
0.8006 0.1060 0.7536 0.0182
2) SOCIAL DESIRABILITY SCALE (SDS)
To estimate the social desirability of participants, the questionnaire used the 17-item scale 
developed by Stöber (2001). This approach uses 17 true/false questions to gauge the propensity 
of an individual to behave in a socially desirable manner. These 17 items have then been 
summed into a single index going from 0 to 17, after reverse-coding those with socially 
undesirable behaviours (highlighted in bold in table A2). Cronbach’s alpha of the final 
variables is 0.55 in week 1, and 0.65 in week 2. On average, participants scored 10.5 in week 
1, and 10.3 in week 2, with no significant difference across treatment groups (Kruskal-Wallis 
test: chi2 = 0.464; p = 0.9268). The variable enters the regressions linearly. 
Table A2: Elements of the SDS scale 
True False
I sometimes litter. o o
I always admit my mistakes openly and face the potential negative consequences. o o
In traffic I am always polite and considerate of others. o o
I have tried illegal drugs (for example, marijuana, cocaine, etc.). o o
I always accept others' opinions, even when they don't agree with my own. o o
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I take out my bad moods on others now and then. o o
There has been an occasion when I took advantage of someone else. o o
In conversations I always listen attentively and let others finish their sentences. o o
I never hesitate to help someone in case of emergency. o o
When I have made a promise, I keep it--no ifs, ands or buts. o o
I occasionally speak badly of others behind their back. o o
I would never live off other people. o o
I always stay friendly and courteous with other people, even when I am stressed out. o o
During arguments I always stay objective and matter-of-fact. o o
There has been at least one occasion when I failed to return an item that I borrowe d. o o
I always eat a healthy diet. o o
Sometimes I only help because I expect something in return. o o
 
